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What does it mean to win a war? 
The meaning, value and normative status of victory in war are seemingly 
well-defined terms. Also, the status of the prospect of some foreseeable 
success, or chance of victory, is a part of Just War Theory. There are other 
issues within this theory regarding victory – when victory is deserved 
and what is the status of the fact of being deserving (or not deserving) a 
victory? What is the connection of deserving to win with the concept of 
defense? In close connection with this are the issues of proper or “just” 
terms of capitulation, and the role of the capitulation in establishing the 
fact of victory as an institutional and social fact: can we have a victory 
without (official, or at least in some way recognized) capitulation? Finally, 
is the capitulation the last resort of defense? 
The normative pair of victory and defeat might be seen as a constitutive 
rule of the institution of war, which opens the issue of legitimacy of 
starting a war: is there a similar condition for a war to be established 
as there is for it to be ended? What is the relation between these two 
points? 
Has the victory become obsolete, perhaps by some (disguised or overt) 
world control where everything can be determined in advance? For 
example, what does it mean to win in Iraq or Afghanistan, or “win the 
war on terror”? Could we think that we might have such a vision of 
legitimate inequality, making the issues of war, and for that matter also 
victory, unnecessary and “overcome”?  
In the now long tradition of ILECS (International Law and Ethics 
Conference Series) we think these might be enticing and provocative 
questions, and we wish to gather leading scholars from all over the world 
to discuss these issues. 
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Jovan Babić, University of Belgrade 
Jovan Babic is Professor of Ethics at Belgrade University, Serbia, and 
Visiting Professor at Portland State University. He has published two 
books, Kant and Scheler (1986), and Morality and Our Time (1998, 2nd 
ed. 2005), both in Serbian, and over sixty academic articles (among which 
are: “Justifying Forgiveness”, Peace Review, Vol 12. No. 1, 2000; “Die 
Pflicht nicht zu lügen - eine vollkommene, jedoch nicht auch juridische 
Pflicht”, Kant-Studien, Vol 91, 2000; “Foreign armed Intervention: 
Between Justified Aid and Illegal Violence”, Humanitarian Intervention: 
Moral and Philosophical Issues, ed by A. Jokic, Broadview Press, Calgary 
2003; and “Toleration vs. Doctrinal Evil in Our Time”, The Journal of 
Ethics, Vol. 8, 2004). 
Victory and/or success
Victory functions as a rule of war, either as a constitutive rule (a 
decision-making rule in disputes which must be solved, but cannot be 
solved in any other way; in which case it has to be accompanied by a 
capitulation  enacting recognition of defeat), or a regulative rule (as 
factual establishment of a state of affairs by which a war ended). This 
conception, especially in its constitutive version, has some advantages 
and some implications, the main advantage being clear determination of 
what the victory is, and implications being, among others, the reciprocity 
of opposing warring sides, the mutual respect of enemies (not treating 
them like criminals for the very fact they are fighting on the other side), 
prima facie moral equality of combatants, rather clear demarcation line 
between ius ad bellum and ius in bello, many kinds of immunity coming 
from there, etc. The concept of capitulation is especially important in 
this context. However, lately, in context of asymmetric warfare, a new 
concept of “victory” emerged: “winning the hearts and minds” (of the 
opposing side, or at least of the attacked side, distorting heavily the 
concept of defense, or self-defense). Another aspect of asymmetric 
warfare, both in theory and attitude of those who are supposed to 
be stronger in this asymmetry, is the problem of how to articulate the 
apriority and stringency of rules (this might be the reason behind many 
critiques of the ius ad bellum/ius in bello distinction). This implies the 
thesis that the stronger side has the right to break rules, based partly 
on the assumption that the weaker party cannot have a chance to win 
by sticking to the rules, and partly on another assumption that “good 
guys” have to win, i. e. cannot be defeated. This is visible in theorizing 
about (and in widespread practice of) military interventions – they look 
very much like police actions where the reciprocity between opposing 
parties is entirely lost. There is not much sense in saying that the police 
“won” (as it, normatively, cannot be “defeated”), while it is quite proper 
talking of its “success” (or “failure”). If the differences between army and 
police disappear, so would the difference between “victory” (which can 
be rather different from any sensible success) and “success”, and victory 
becomes redundant and obsolete. There wouldn’t be any need to talk 
of victory any longer (as is visible in the prevailing jargon in the West). 
However, in this case the success gets in trouble as well. Reduced to 
bottom line it implies what might be the characteristic of contemporary 
asymmetric warfare: the situation in which two police, or police-like, 
forces (one or both of which could be, regarding the modality of their 
representation, ad hoc self-defensive forces, “militias”) fight, treating 
each other as criminals (as terrorists, usurpers, aggressors, crusaders, 
etc.). No victory there, only imperialistic paternalism, on one side, and 
survival or annihilation on the other side. 
notes
J. Angelo Corlett, San Diego State University
J. Angelo Corlett, PhD, is Professor of Philosophy & Ethics at San Diego 
State University and author of more than 100 books and articles in 
philosophy, including articles in such journals as Analysis; American 
Philosophical Quarterly; The Classical Quarterly; International Journal 
for Philosophy of Religion; Journal of Medicine and Philosophy; Journal 
of Social Philosophy; and Philosophy. His books include Analyzing Social 
Knowledge (1996); Terrorism: A Philosophical Analysis (2003); Race, 
Racism, and Reparations (2003); Interpreting Plato’s Dialogues (2005); 
Race, Rights, and Justice (2009); Heirs of Oppression (2010); The Errors 
of Atheism (2010); and Responsibility and Punishment (2014). He is the 
author of the forthcoming book, Interpreting Plato Socratically: Socrates 
and Justice, and is currently completing a book on social knowledge. He is 
the Editor-in-Chief of The Journal of Ethics: An International Philosophical 
Review.
Who Wins in Wars?
This paper provides a partial answer to the question of who or what wins 
in wars by directing its primary attention to the moral and economic 
senses of winning wars. 
notes
Jovana Davidovic, University of Iowa 
Jovana Davidovic is Assistant Professor at the Philosophy Department, 
University of Iowa. Her areas of specialization are military ethics, moral 
and political philosophy, applied ethics and philosophy of law. 
Changing Character of Wars and Reductionist Accounts of War 
War has changed so much that it barely resembles the paradigmatic cases 
of armed conflict that just war theory and international humanitarian 
law seemed to have had in mind even a few decades ago. The changing 
character of war includes not only the use of new technology and 
drones, but probably more problematically the changing temporal and 
spatial scope of war, and the changing character of actors in war. Parallel 
to these changes in the way wars are fought, there has been a shift in 
theories dealing with war, resulting in numerous attempts at revision. 
One prominent recent revision of just war theory- the reductionist 
theory- starts from the claim that ordinary morality analyses of, for 
example, self- and other-defense can inform our answers to difficult 
moral questions that arise in war; questions like who can be killed or 
when is a war justified. While reductionist approaches have been quite 
useful in answering many of the difficult moral dilemmas arising in war, 
they have also been criticized both with respect to their ability to capture 
an essential commitment of jus ad bellum- namely a right to national 
self-defense and with respect to consequences of the approach for jus 
in bello, namely for questions of proportionality and necessity in war. In 
this paper, I develop an argument that the changing character of war is 
all the more reason to take seriously the revisionist accounts of war of 
the reductionist kind.
notes
Ned Dobos, UNSW Canberra 
Ned Dobos is Lecturer in International and Political Studies at the 
University of New South Wales, Australia, and an adjunct researcher with 
the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics. He has held visiting 
fellowships at the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, and at the 
MacMillan Centre for International Studies at Yale University. Dr. Dobos is 
the author of Insurrection and Intervention: the Two Faces of Sovereignty 
(Cambridge University Press 2012), co-author of The New Pacifism: Just 
War in the Real World (Oxford University Press, forthcoming), and co-
editor of Global Financial Crisis: the Ethical Issues (Palgrave). 
Idealism, Realism, and Success in Armed Humanitarian Intervention
The 2001 report of the ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, sets out a 
list of conditions that must be satisfied before armed intervention 
becomes a morally acceptable option. There must be large scale loss of 
life or ethnic cleansing; the intervention must a proportional last resort; 
and of course there must be a reasonable prospect of success. These 
are put forward as threshold criteria; requirements whose fulfilment is 
necessary for intervention to be justified. But in addition to this, the ICISS 
report mentions two features of intervention which, though not morally 
necessary, enhance its moral credentials: to wit, disinterestedness and 
international authorisation. The report states that ideally, AHI should be 
motivated purely by altruistic concern; ulterior economic or geopolitical 
motives should be absent. And ideally, intervention should be carried 
out under the auspices of the UN Security Council. Unilateralism and 
self-interest are not always sufficient to delegitimize an intervention, 
but a purely motivated, UN sanctioned intervention is always morally 
preferable. This paper explores the relationship between these ideals 
and the threshold requirement of a reasonable prospect of success. 
notes
Aleksandar Fatić, Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory,      
University of Belgrade 
Aleksandar Fatić is Research Professor at the Institute for Philosophy and 
Social Theory, University of Belgrade. His main interests lie in practical 
philosophy, specifically in political philosophy, philosophical practice 
and applied ethics. He is the author of Reconciliation via the War Crimes 
Tribunal? (2000), Freedom and Heteronomy: An Essay on the Liberal 
Society (2009) and, with  Klaus Bachmann, of The UN International 
Criminal Tribunals: Transition without Justice (2015, forthcoming), along 
with many other titles. 
The value narrative in the moral justification 
of international intervention 
The paper discusses the foundations of the moral evaluation of 
international military interventions in the context of the narrative theory 
of identity. The narrative theory portrays the collective identities and 
value systems of both the interveners and those against whom the 
intervention is launched in terms of ‘narratives’ of ‘life stories’ of the 
communities. The author argues that the narrative theory provides the 
most useful tools to develop models of moral evaluation of particular 
interventions. He suggests that, unlike the deontological moral theories, 
which operate te terms such as ‘moral obligation’ or ‘duty’ to intervene, 
the narrative theory does no aspire to universality, but is capable of 
integrating empirical evaluations and comparisons, thus allowing the 
establishment of credibility or lack of credibility to intervene, superiority 
of the interveners’ narrative, and a number of other factors. This allows 
the narrative theory to discriminate between particular interventions, 
without drawing generalized conclusions as to whether international 
interventions are morally justified or unjustified. The theory allows 
easy incorporation in the existing political institutions and practice, 
and promises to enhance the profile of moral evaluations within them. 
Finally, the theory allows for an empirically informed moral critique 
of military interventions based on the qualities of the value systems 
constitutive of the collective identities of the interveners, as well as 
those which the interveners attempt to address in the intervening 
theaters. In some cases, as the author shows, although the social and 
economic differences between the interveners and the communities 
against which interventions are aimed are enormous, the qualities of the 
value systems in the sense of normative power, consistency and stability, 
suggest a superiority of the narratives of the recipients of intervention to 
those of the intervening states. However, the narrative theory makes the 
conclusions about moral evaluations of interventions dependent on the 
specific interpretation of the relevant facts and value-judgments made 
with regard to what features of the intervention, the interveners, or the 
recipients of the intervention are deemed morally decisive.
notes
Borislav Grozdić, Ilija Kajtez, Dragan Gostović, Military Academy, 
University of Defence in Belgrade 
Borislav Grozdić is a colonel, associate professor at the Military Academy, 
University of Defence in Belgrade. Born in 1959. After graduation at the 
Military Academy in Belgrade, he held numerous assignments in the 
Armed Forces and Ministry of Defence of Serbia. He reached a PhD 
degree at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade. Since 
2007, he has been a lecturer at the Military Academy in the subject of 
Military Ethics. Published books: Orthodoxy and War (2001); Fight for 
Belief and Fatherland (2003); Collection of Papers The Military and Belief 
(2001); Reader Military Ethics (2009); Holy Warriors (2013).
Ilija Kajtez is a colonel, associate professor at the Military Academy, 
University of Defence in Belgrade. Born in 1961. He graduated from the 
Air Force Academy in Zadar, as well as from the Faculty of Philosophy 
(Department of Philosophy and Sociology) in Zadar. He completed his 
doctoral degree studies in Political Sociology and was granted a PhD 
degree at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade. Since 
1991, he has been a lecturer at the Military Academy in the subjects of 
Sociology and Philosophy. Currently, he is the head of the Department 
of Social Sciences. He was also lecturing at the Faculty of Security 
Studies, University of Belgrade, in the field of Non-Violence Studies. He 
was declared to be the best lecturer at the Military Academy in 2012. 
Published books: The Sense and Trace (1999); Revolutionary Violence 
- the Anthem to Freedom or Apology of Evil (2009); The Wisdom and 
Sword - Philosophers on Secrets of Peace and War (2012).
Dragan Gostović is a colonel (retired), associate professor at the 
Military Academy, University of Defence in Belgrade. Born in 1956. 
After graduation at the Military Academy in Belgrade as the best cadet, 
he held numerous assignments in the Armed Forces and Ministry of 
Defence of Serbia. He reached a PhD degree at the Faculty of Political 
Science, University of Belgrade, in the field of political systems. Retired 
in 2009. At present, he is a part-time lecturer at the Military Academy in 
Belgrade. Published books: Political Representation and Elections (1999); 
Political System (2001) as co-author; The Executive Branch as a State 
Function (2006).
Ortodox view at victory and defeat in war
This essay analyses the orthodox view on victory and defeat in war, which 
means that, beside the unified Christian stance point, it focuses on the 
peculiarities of orthodox Christianity on the issue. The orthodox view is 
based on the ideas, beliefs and values found in the Scripture, both Old 
and New Testament, and the teachings of holy fathers, Orthodox Church 
canons, hagiographic writings of Christian-Orthodox saints, beliefs of 
Orthodox theologs and philosophers and the official views and practices 
of local Orthodox churches. The core of the essay is represented by the 
spiritual and moral aspects of war, the Orthodox view on the goal and the 
purpose of war and waging war, and the relive of constriction between 
honest and just combat and victory in war.
notes
Asa Kasher, Tel Aviv University
Asa Kasher is Laura Schwarz-Kipp Professor Emeritus of Professional 
Ethics and Philosophy of Practice, and Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, 
Tel-Aviv University. He is also professor of Philosophy, Shalem College, 
Jerusakem and member of European Academy of Science and 
Humanities. He held visiting positions in many universities, including 
UCLA, Oxford, Amsterdam, Berlin, Brussels, Calgary and Torino. Wrote 
more than 250 papers and ethics documents as well as several books 
in various areas of philosophy, including: Military Ethics, a book that 
won the national prize for military literature. He wrote the first Code 
of Ethics of the IDF; an IDF document on the Military Ethics of Fighting 
Terror (written together with Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin now ret.)); and an 
IDF document on Ethics of Disengagement (with Maj. Gen (now ret.) 
Eyal Ben Reuven), as well as codes of ethics for major divisions of the 
IDF. Has worked (with others) on the Code of Ethics of the Knesset, the 
parliament of Israel, in a committee appointed by the speaker of the 
Knesset, and (with others) on the Code of Ethics of the Ministers, in a 
committee appointed by the Prime Minister. He was a member of a three 
member team appointed by the Minister of Defense to set principles 
for negotiating release of abducted citizens, particularly ones in military 
uniform. For his contributions to Philosophy, he won the Prize of Israel, 
the highest national prize, 2000. 
The role of victory in new wars
In the tradition of military forces, especially in democracies, there is a 
value that soldiers are instructed and educated to try to embody the 
pursuit of victory. The pursuit of victory was apt for classical, regular war, 
such as WWII (victory at all costs, despite of all terror). The question is 
whether this model of victory is applicable to additional areas of violent 
conflicts such as war on terrorism, cyber warfare, irregular war etc. 
notes
Boris Kashnikov, Moscow Higher School of Economics 
Dr. Boris Kashnikov is a professor of philosophy at National Research 
University - Higher School of Economics, Moscow. He was a Director 
of the Moscow office of the International Crisis Group in 2003 - 2004. 
One year in 1993-1994 he worked for the UN mission in the former 
Yugoslavia during the war and in 1989 he worked in Nagorny Karabakh 
during the separatism conflict in this Caucasian Republic. He is a three 
times Fulbright professor in the USA   (George Mason University 2010-
2011, Emory University 1999-2000 and the Mershon Center of the Ohio 
State University 1996 -1997). Two times DAAD visiting professor at Ruhr 
University, Germany at the center of International Law of Peace and 
Military conflict (2013-2014 and 2004-2005). 
Professor Kashnikov has been consulted as an expert advisor for the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, Central Asia. For a number 
of years he was a member of the board of the Journal of Military 
Ethics, Norway. On many occasions he has given guest lectures for the 
Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., the Alson and Margaret 
Johnson Foundation in Helsinki, the International Criminal Law Network 
at The Hague, Renmin University in China and other research centers 
and universities. His publications in English include “Terrorism. The 
New World Disorder”, London: Continuum, 2007 and several chapters in 
“Moral Constraints on War”, Lexington Books, 2008 (In coauthorship). In 
Russian he has published a monograph “Liberal Theories of Justice and 
the Russian Political Practice”. 
Is it possible to win the just war?
Victory is a result of a happy marriage of what is truly a success to what 
is truly a war. Only a defensive war may be truly a success and thus make 
a true victory. Any other justification of war even is self deceptive. At 
the same time War must be distinguished from other forms of massive 
violence such as police operation, rape, terror, ethnic cleansing and 
torture. These are the forms of violence, which always go alongside a 
war, but they are not a truly war. War is truly a war if and only if it is: 
notes
1. More or less fair. War is supposed to be a competition of near equals.
2. Imply some risk of life. The pilots of strategic bombers, much less the 
operators of drones are usually despised as not really soldiers.
3. Presuppose at least some respect for an enemy; we are waging a war 
on. 
4. Proportional and discriminative at least to a certain minimum. The 
war of extermination is not truly a war. 
The laws of language reserve Victory for war only. There can be no 
victorious genocide, terrorism or torture, although they may be 
successful in a way. The problem of the contemporary war is the merging 
of a war in a proper sense with other forms of massive violence, like 
police operation or terror. The major problem of the contemporary 
warfare is simply the lack of war in a proper sense. War disappears, it 
seizes to exist. The contemporary war is an asymmetric one, it does not 
imply much risk for the strongest side and the contemporary weapons 
are by and large disproportional and indiscriminative. To make bad things 
worse, the so called Just War Theory is actively reviving the idea of the 
Holy war under the guise of Jus ad Bellum princiles. The war for abstract 
values does not presuppose any respect for an enemy. The enmity 
becomes absolute, war dissolves in the totality of massive violence, and 
politics becomes the continuation of war by other means. These wars 
may be successful in some limited sense, but they never end the cycle of 
violence and thus an exercise in futility in the long run. The recent wars 
(Iraq, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Ukraine) are a perfect demonstration of this 
dangerous tendency. 
notes
Jan Narveson, University of Waterloo
Jan Narveson is Distinguished Professor Emeritus of the University of 
Waterloo in Ontario, Canada, and President of the Kitchener-Waterloo 
Chamber Music Society. He is also President of the Institute for Liberal 
Studies. 
On liberal wars in contemporary times: “winning” is not the object
In the past, anyway, the idea, at least, was that somebody attacks and 
somebody else defends. The attackers either succeed in acquiring the 
territory previously belonging to the enemy, in which case they win, 
or the defenders succeed in warding them off, in which case they win. 
On occasion the defenders are more successful than that, and become 
the attackers in turn, and so on. Meanwhile, a great many people on 
both sides are killed or wounded, and virtually everybody makes a lot of 
involuntary contributions, financial and otherwise, to the whole thing. 
Looked at from the point of view of individuals, one might suggest that 
in reality, nobody wins. That was perhaps not true long ago, when war 
was a sort of wholesale effort at larceny, as with the Vikings. But for 
decent nations, that’s out of the question. We do not aim at “conquest”; 
we aim, rather, at a just peace, which is essentially one in which our lives 
and ways of life are not subject to the sort of dangers, or heavy coercion, 
that we would be if the people we’re trying to defeat have their way. 
So far as military adventurism, imperialism, and so on are concerned, 
we can dismiss them as both immoral and stupid. Immoral, obviously, 
because of our liberal outlooks. And stupid, because modern wars are 
extremely expensive, and one could never gain from them in comparison 
with peaceable trading activity. 
Of course the concept of winning in war is not confined to liberals. For 
others, there are objectives and these can be attained, or frustrated. But 
the question of what it does or could amount to is especially serious for 
the rest of us - for the liberal states. The point is that liberal states are 
absolutely committed to refraining from strictly aggressive wars. They 
are not absolutely committed to refraining from wars designed to protect 
notes
the citizens of foreign states from oppression by their own governments, 
nor of course from operations designed to root out genuine threats, as of 
terrorism. But military operations for such purposes are, as bitter recent 
experience dramatically demonstrates, virtually incapable of achieving 
their objects in any thoroughgoing way. We can’t speak of victory but 
only of progress, or lack of it, and at how much cost.
It is difficult to see how any precise philosophical program can solve this 
kind of problem. If we abstain from all kinds of military intervention, in 
modern circumstances we simply throw the door open to the worst kind 
of government. If we don’t abstain, we are into the foregoing problem. 
It is hard to see that any precise philosophical progress is here possible. 
We must maintain the distinction between those activities of others, 
however foreign to us, which are interpersonally harmless and entitle 
its practitioners to whatever possible protections there are, and those 
activities that are genuine threats to others, and therefore to peace. 
Peace is our fundamental proper goal, always. What precisely its pursuit 
means in a great range of all-too-possible circumstances is another 
matter. 
notes
Aleksandar Pavkovic, Macquarie University
Dr. Aleksandar Pavković is an Associate Professor, Department of 
Government, University of Macau, teaching political theory and 
comparative politics. His university education was primarily in philosophy 
which he first taught at Belgrade University and the University of 
Melbourne. He later taught Serbian and European Studies as well 
as political theory at Macquarie University, Sydney. He is currently 
coordinator of the Master of European Studies program at the University 
of Macau. His research interests are Theory and practice of secession, 
nationalism and nationalist movements. He read DrSci Belgrade 
University and obtained Bachelor of Philosophy in philosophy. University 
of Oxford, BA (magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa), MA in philosophy, Yale 
University. He taught in various universities in Europe, Australia and Asia.
The secessionist wars: the last vestiges of legitimate conquest?
In secessionist conflicts, secessionists attempt to remove the host-state 
(or the opposing) military forces from the territory they claim for their 
future state. Only by removing these opposing forces, can they achieve 
military and political control of that territory. In short, in order to establish 
their state and seek international recognition, they need to conquer the 
contested territory. But in most - although not all - cases they are not 
capable to achieving this without the military intervention  from outside 
states: these  states then conquer the disputed territory by force and 
hand it over to the secessionists. The two recent examples of this kind 
of action are Kosovo in 1999 and Bangladesh in 1971. Under the UN 
Charter this kind of territorial conquest of one state by another would be 
considered illegal and illegitimate, yet in the case of secessionist conflict 
it is not so regarded. In this paper, we shall examine a few normative 
justifications of this kind of conquest. Whatever justification one may 
offer for it, the victory of the secessionists in a secessionist war is still a 
rather old-fashioned victory: it involves the expulsion of the opposing 
forces from the disputed territory and its take-over by military force.   
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Peacemaking and Victory: Lessons from Kant’s Cosmopolitanism
In the various texts in which Immanuel Kant discusses the principles 
that should govern relations among nations—including those texts that 
explicitly deal with the sources that lead states to engage one another in 
armed conflict and the circumstances that enable its cessation—he does 
not directly engage the question “What constitutes victory in war?” This 
should not be all that surprising given the mordant irony that pervades 
much of Kant’s treatment of war and of the “principles” by which 
“moralizing politicians” justify the use of force as an instrument of policy 
in an international order that they view as Hobbes’s “state of nature” writ 
large. The substance and the tone of Kant’s dismissal of the Realpolitik 
that guides “moralizing politicians” indicate that the key dynamic in his 
thinking about war arises from his account of the principles of human 
moral self-governance (i.e., autonomy) that are operative in the practical 
use of reason. Kant will thus argue that “a cosmopolitan perspective,” 
which the practical (moral) exercise of our reason enables us to take 
upon the role of human moral action in history, provides the basis from 
which we may justifiably hope in the effectiveness of the efforts we 
take to establish conditions for lasting peace. In consequence, it thus 
becomes possible to offer a definitive Kantian answer to the question 
“What constitutes victory in war?” by framing it in reference to this 
cosmopolitan hope for the establishment of an international order for 
securing enduring peace.    
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War, Victory, and Prospects of Success
A boxer can win a fight without getting what he fought for (for example, 
the prize money). And he can lose and still be rewarded. Likewise, a party 
can win a war (that is, militarily overcome the enemy) yet fail to get what 
it fought for; or it can loose and get (part of) what it fought for. Thus, 
winning wars is overestimated, as it were; and it should be clear that 
the just war criterion of “prospects of success” is not a valid criterion if 
supposed to refer to winning wars. But many argue that what justifies 
a war is its being a (necessary and proportionate) response to a rights 
violation with the aim of defending against, rectifying, or punishing said 
rights violation. Thus, isn’t “prospects of success” a valid criterion if it 
refers to these aims? I shall explain why this is not necessarily the case.
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Synecdoche Errors in Popular Discourse about Victory and Defeat
It has now become almost banal to speak of Pyrrhic victories as 
tantamount to defeat. And we know that there are OTHER autonomous 
effects of victory that are tantamount to defeat. So I want to address a 
less rehearsed issue. I want to note that both during and at the end of a 
war we talk about the winning ‘side’ and the losing ‘side’. But such talk 
obscures - indeed it is often DESIGNED to obscure - that there are always 
many sides within a ‘side’. For example, in 2003 what for some Iraqis 
was an occupation for others was a liberation. So which ‘side’ shall we 
say won that war? So in this paper I proffer a taxonomy of ‘sides’ which 
I hope is neither too fine-grained nor too course-grained to encourage a 
more sophisticated public discourse about victory and defeat. 
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Remote Killing and the Remoteness of Winning 
The use of drones and stand-off weapons has increased exponentially in 
recent years, causing a mounting wave of concern amongst the media 
and public about the implications of using unmanned systems – often 
misunderstood in their nature – above all in terms of accountability, 
legitimacy and ‘fairness’. This paper explores several facets of this 
question, in order to see how a reliance on remote war fighting may 
affect the type of wars we choose to fight and the possibility of achieving 
victory in those wars.
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